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Abstract  
Given a client/server application, how can the server 
entrust the integrity of the remote client, albeit the latter 
is running on an un-trusted machine? To address this 
research problem, we propose a novel approach based 
on the client-side generation of an execution signature, 
which is remotely checked by the server, wherein 
signature generation is locked to the entrusted software 
by means of code integrity checking. Our approach 
exploits the features of dynamic aspect-oriented 
programming (AOP) to extend the power of code 
integrity checkers in several ways. This paper both 
presents our approach and describes a prototype 
implementation for a messaging application. 
1. Introduction 
Security has always been a primary concern for 
industry, and recently the interest for client-side 
software protection has grown. In general, network-
enabled software suffers from some inherent security 
problems, like unauthorized modification by either 
malicious individuals (host machine cannot be trusted 
because of the user threat) or digital entities, like viruses 
and Trojan horses (host machine cannot be trusted 
because of the network threat). Many circumstances do 
exist in which it is necessary to protect software from 
malicious modifications once it is delivered to the 
public, e.g., e-voting and e-commerce systems. 
In particular, this work has been carried out in the 
context of a research project aiming at providing an 
answer to the following research question: How can be a 
client application entrusted albeit running on an un-
trusted machine? With the term “un-trusted machine” 
we mean a networked computing base (e.g., networked 
computers and mobile devices) in which a possibly 
malicious user has complete (conceivably physical) 
access to system resources (e.g., memory and disks) and 
tools (e.g., debuggers) in order to reverse-engineer the 
application code. In the scope of this paper, an 
application is deemed trusted whenever its executed 
code has not been altered prior to and during execution. 
Satisfying such integrity requirement in a hostile 
environment is a challenging issue and TrustedFlow is 
the all-in-software solution we present to tackle the 
problem [1].  
In our approach, clients emanate a continuous flow of 
idiosyncratic tags towards to server. The tags flow is 
generated by a software module that is securely 
combined with the original application. As far as the 
application code remains genuine, the module will 
produce valid tags, which are used as continuous 
evidence to the remote server that the client code is 
authentic. Note that disabling the module is not an 
option for the attacker. In such case, tags would no 
longer be produced and the server would notice the 
attack attempt immediately. This work presents 
prototypal implementation of TrustedFlow based on the 
deployment and nonstop replacement of integrity-
checking modules implemented as dynamic aspects. As 
further discussed in the related-work section, traditional 
integrity self-checking techniques offer no guaranty that 
self-check has been actually performed. As a major 
contribution, our approach provides remote verification 
of tags in order to verifying that the check has been duly 
preformed. 
Our solution can be deployed in several usage 
scenarios. In particular, it can be used to restrict access 
to a public server, to let in genuine clients only, possibly 
distributed by the server itself. Examples of existing 
applications are Yahoo services (Yahoo advanced 
services are available only to users deploying Yahoo’s 
client), gambling servers, and on-line submission of 
final exams. Along these lines, a messaging system, 
composed of a server acting as entrusting entity and a 
client acting as entrusted entity, has been developed as a 
proof of concept. 
2. Related Work 
In general, tamper resistance is pursued by means of 
a set of methodologies aimed at protecting software 
from unauthorized modification, distribution, and use. 
Among the several possible attacks, we focus on 
integrity attacks, i.e., those aiming at tampering with 
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application code for malicious purposes, like bypassing 
security, infringing licenses, or forcing different 
execution (e.g., to manipulate ballots in e-voting 
applications).  
Different solutions have been proposed in literature 
to protect software from above-mentioned rogue 
behaviors, being integrity self-checking the main 
representative.  
Most of commercial applications just rely on static 
self-checking, in which the program checks its integrity 
only once, during start-up (e.g. to check license code), 
while current research is focusing on dynamic self-
checking, in which the program verifies regularly its 
integrity during run-time. The key issue is to avoid that 
the self-checking function itself is removed or disabled, 
without being detected. To this aim, networks of 
integrity-checkers (called guards) were proposed to 
detect changes to binary code [2]. Protection against 
code modification is enforced by including a large 
number of guards, each protecting a fraction of the 
application. Clearly, the task of finding and disabling all 
guards is significantly more difficult. A similar approach 
provides a mechanism to redundantly test for changes 
[3].  
Chen et al. [4] compute a fingerprint of application 
code on the basis of its actual execution. This method 
makes it possible to thwart attacks using automatic 
program analysis tools and other static methods. 
Obfuscation aims at increasing the attack complexity 
by making it hard for the attacker to comprehend the 
behavior of a decompiled program [5]. Obfuscation 
techniques are based on the addition of complexity to 
source code structure (without changing its behavior) 
through different kinds of code transformations. Code 
obfuscation transformations are also employed to hide a 
tamper resistance code embedded in the software so that 
it cannot be easily detected and removed. However, in 
most cases, breaking obfuscation it is just a matter of 
time and attacker’s skills [6], and the overhead of 
obfuscation techniques can be significant both in terms 
of code size increase and execution time overhead. 
Customization creates many different copies from an 
initial version of a program [7]. Each copy of the 
protected program is different in its binary shape, but it 
is functionally equivalent to other copies. Thus, 
published exploits to attack one version might not work 
with other customized versions. This kind of protection 
discourages diffusion of “cracks” but it does not aim at 
detecting and reacting to tampering. 
Another way to inhibit cracks diffusion is pursued by 
means of techniques like Software aging [14] aiming at 
frequently distributing new updates of a program: this 
also allows dynamic renewal of software protection 
techniques embedded in the application. 
As mentioned, our approach proposes a software-
only solution. On the contrary, trusted computing
initiatives [8] rely on a trusted hardware platform to 
build software authenticity from the ground up.  For 
instance, an implementation of trusted computing 
principles was proposed using a trusted coprocessor and 
a modified Linux kernel [9]. In that work, the authors 
create a chain of trust where BIOS and coprocessor 
measure integrity of the operating system at startup, then 
the operating system measure integrity of applications, 
then applications measure integrity of dynamically 
loaded modules, and so on. 
In conclusion, when compared to existing integrity 
checking techniques (both software-based and 
hardware-based), our approach extends prior art in 
several direction. First, it provides remote verification 
that checking has been actually performed. Furthermore, 
in our implementation the checking component can be 
replaced dynamically at run time by means of software 
updates. Such quality improves the overall strength of 
the technique we propose since attackers have limited 
time resources to break the checks (see Section 4 for 
further details). 
3. TrustedFlow Principles and Prototype 
Architecture 
The key element of our approach is the software 
module implementing the tag generator on board the 
client application. The module must conform to two 
basic principles.  
? Interlocking describes the combination of the 
original application with the tag generator, so that 
they are bound to each other in an inseparable 
manner.   
? Hiding describes countermeasures that are 
necessary for the tag generator to ensure that 
reverse engineering is practically infeasible. 
On the client side, the Trusted Tag Generator (TTG) 
constantly generates an unpredictable flow of tags, 
constituting the continuous idiosyncratic signature (that 
cannot be forged) of the software’s execution. Tags are 
attached to data sent by the client towards the server. 
Tags are bound to both the state of the TTG (e.g., 
current encryption key and number of tags previously 
sent) and traffic generated by client software. On the 
server side, the Trusted Tag Checker (TTC) entrusts the 
integrity of client software by verifying the correctness 
of tags flow. 
For increased robustness, the algorithm used to 
generate the tags should not require a strong 
synchronization between TTC and TTG. For instance, 
current implementation uses a block cipher [10] in 
counter mode and includes the counter value among the 
data transmitted between the TTC and the TTG. 
Moreover, cryptographic functions can be employed to 
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bind tags to transmitted data. For example, a message 
authentication code (HMAC) of both the data unit and 
the related tag can be attached by the TTG to protect 
against alteration of data associated to a valid tag. 
Alternatively, a HMAC calculation can be part of the tag 
generation algorithm. 
To show the applicability of our approach, we 
developed a prototype implementation of TrustedFlow 
relying on dynamic AOP that was deployed in a Java-
based messaging service (i.e., a client/server chat 
system)  
3.1. AOP tutorial 
Aspect-Oriented Programming [11] is a new 
programming paradigm easing the modularization of 
crosscutting concerns in object-oriented software 
development. In particular, developers can remove 
scattered code related to crosscutting concerns from 
classes and placing them into elements called aspects. 
This methodology is implemented by different AOP 
platforms; all these tools rely on their own join-point 
model, which defines the points along the execution of a 
program that can be possibly addressed by an aspect. 
Thus, AOP involves a compiling process, called 
weaving, for the actual insertion of aspect code into pre-
existing application source code or bytecode. When 
using a dynamic AOP platform, e.g. PROSE [12], 
weaving can also occur at run-time. 
In PROSE platform, an aspect is a normal Java class 
containing a set of Crosscut objects. A crosscut contains 
a method called advice and a pointcutter object 
identifying at which points in the dynamic execution of 
the program, advice code should be executed. For 
example, a pointcutter describes sets of join points by 
specifying the objects and methods to be considered, or 
a specific method execution. 
PROSE offers a rich set of crosscuts: among these 
the ‘MethodCall’ crosscut intercepts method calls 
PROSE uses a wildcard-based syntax to construct the 
pointcutters in order to capture join points that share 
common characteristics, and it provides logical 
operators to form complex matching rules by combining 
simple pointcutters. 
Dynamic AOP platforms can be further distinguished 
in two categories: platforms with fixed pointcut 
definition and platforms with dynamic pointcut 
definition. In the former case the application code is 
instrumented once, at first deployment, in order to 
identify candidate join-points; then the related advice 
code can be added at load-time and then updated at 
runtime. PROSE use a dynamic pointcut redefinition: 
the application is not instrumented and the actual join-
points are determined at runtime by the platform, 
depending on the pointcutters defined in the aspect.  
We decide to use PROSE platform, because of its 
high dynamicity that can be an advantage for our 
purposes: in fact, if the attacker knew which parts of the 
application will be addressed by the aspects, (s)he could 
use them as a possible starting point for an attack. 
3.2. Prototype design 
We started from an existing prototype of chat system, 
previously developed in the context of a Java course. 
Thanks to the transparent use of dynamic AOP, the 
client program needs no changes. Therefore, once the 
chat client program is released and distributed to users, 
attackers cannot get clues about the integrity strategy the 
server will adopt. In contrast with a normal chat 
application, the client-side program must be executed 
within the PROSE runtime environment. Concerning the 
server program, it was extended to integrate with the 
TTC server module. 
As shown in right-hand side of Figure 1, main 
components of the TrustedFlow prototype are the 
Aspect Manager, the Aspect Factory and the Code 
Checker. Aspect Manager provides the Chat Server with 
the interface to access TrustedFlow functionalities, 
namely the registration of a new client and the 
verification of tagged messages. Aspect Manager is 
assisted by the Tag Checker, which validates the tags 
carried by user messages, and by the Aspect Factory, 
which dynamically generates the code of the to-be-
deployed aspect.  
Dyn AOP runtime
Chat
Server
replace
TagMsg
Aspect
Factory
load
Tag 
Checker
Aspect
Manager
TrustedFlowChat Client
Code Checker 
and
Tag Generator 
(aspect)
Figure 1. TrustedFlow with Dynamic AOP
As shown in left-hand side of Figure 1, when a new 
client comes in, a new aspect is crafted by the Aspect 
Factory and the Aspect Manager loads it in the 
execution environment of the upcoming client. The 
aspect implements both code integrity checker (that 
behaves as a watchdog for the client program and looks 
for integrity breaches) and the trusted tag generator 
aspect (that seamlessly appends a tag to each user 
message). Finally, note that the aspect can be replaced 
by the Aspect Manager at any moment during runtime.
4. Anti-Tampering with Dynamic Aspects  
To counter reverse engineering, current software-
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based tamper-resistance techniques rely on code 
checkers whose position is hidden in the application and 
whose behavior is obfuscated. 
However, we observe that any technique involving a 
checker that is permanently embedded within the 
application is not robust enough. Indeed, the checker 
can be eventually identified and inhibited by an attacker 
with enough knowledge, time, and reverse engineering 
tools. Under such conditions, there are no guarantees 
that a remote client is actually undergoing to all the 
checks it is supposed to.  
TrustedFlow overcomes such limitation by 
supporting dynamic replacement of the checker module, 
which is implemented as a dynamic aspect. The checker 
is bundled as an independent aspect, which is sent to the 
client at startup and can be updated dynamically at any 
time. The update rate can be tuned according to the 
security requirements of the target application domains 
(from minutes to days).  
Nonetheless, other techniques, such as obfuscation, 
are still a valuable addendum in order to make it even 
harder for a rogue user to hack the checker code. A 
checker that is both mobile and obfuscated gives an 
additional degree of freedom to customize the security 
level: the stronger obfuscation, the lower the update rate 
can be, and vice versa. 
Implementing anti-tampering techniques with AOP 
tools is intuitively useful because aspects can be seen as 
additional code having a privileged view on the 
application code and data. Moreover AOP weavers help 
“hooking” integrity checkers in the application code in a 
simple and flexible way, instead of using ad-hoc pre-
compilers like most of the current approaches. In 
particular, the power of pointcutters composition rules is 
suitable for a flexible management and distribution of 
checking code in a large code base. 
The dynamic aspect is composed by a tag generator 
crosscut, and two checkers crosscuts, i.e. the sandbox 
checker and the bytecode checker. 
4.1 The Tag-Generator Crosscut 
The Tag Generator crosscut intercepts network 
transmissions to the chat server in order to obliviously 
insert authentication tags in the data sent out by the 
client application.  
The chat client relies on Java sockets to communicate 
with the chat server. The following code snippet of the 
Tag Generator shows the advice (method 
METHOD_ARGS) and the pointcutter which intercept 
all the messages sent by the client through a Java socket.  
Each Tag Generator has a counter that is incremented 
each time a new message is sent out. The Tag Generator 
also shares a temporary symmetric encryption key with 
the TTC. Each client has a different key and keys can be 
changed at any time by updating the corresponding Tag 
Generator aspect.  
1. public Crosscut tagGenerator = new MethodCut() {
2. public void METHOD_ARGS(PrintWriter p, String msg) {
3. StringBuffer tag = new StringBuffer(msg);
4. tag.append( crypt( counter, key ));
5. tag = hash(tag); 
6. p.println(tag); 
7. p.println(counter); p.flush();
8. counter++;
9. } 
10. protected PointCutter pointCutter() {
11. PointCutter socket = 
12. Within.method("println").AND(type("PrintWriter"));
13. return Executions.before().AND(socket);
14. }
15.};
Figure 2. The Tag Generator Crosscut
Tags are generated according to the following 
algorithm: 
? Using the secret key, the Tag Generator encrypts the 
current counter value with the AES block cipher 
(line 4).
? The resulting block is concatenated with the plain 
user message (line 4) and then hashed to produce the 
tag (line 5) 
? The resulting tag and the current counter are pre-
pended to the message network transmission (line 6). 
Note that valid tags are generated unless the Tag 
Checker discovers a tampering attempt. In that case, the 
checkers invalidates the symmetric key used by the 
generator. On the receiver side, the server calculates the 
expected tag for the received message and compares the 
result with the tag sent by the client. In case of forged 
tags, the Chat Server reacts by inhibiting any further 
network communication coming from the suspected 
host; otherwise the plain message is relayed to clients. 
The TrustedFlow module on the server side, 
automatically updates each Tag Generator whenever the 
aspect aging timer elapses. 
Considering Figure 2, when a new Client signs in 
with the Chat Server (1), the latter informs the Aspect 
Manager (2) as to get the aspect pushed to the client 
environment. The Aspect Manager maintains a list of 
opened Client Sessions, each containing the 
TrustedFlow-related information for the corresponding 
Client, like the current shared key and the aging status 
of the deployed aspect.  
Particularly, when a Client registers, a new Client 
Session instance is created (3). In turn, the Client 
Session contacts the Tag Checker singleton component 
to obtain a fresh key (4). Finally, the Aspect Factory 
generates the Java code for the customized versions of 
both Code Checker and Tag Generator aspects (5) and 
the Client session deploys them to the Client (6). 
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Figure 3. Client registration scenario 
The aspect is automatically built by the Aspect 
Factory in the TrustedFlow module on the server side, 
using an Aspect Template that accommodates for the 
customization of main parameters, as the initial value of 
the counter and the secret key. Upon installation, each 
PROSE aspect can execute an initialization procedure 
before being woven. Our prototype exploits this feature 
to add extra security check. Namely, during the 
initialization phase, the newly deployed aspect verifies 
the checksum of older aspect bytecode, before 
withdrawing it. In case of mismatch, the newcomer 
aspect invalidates the encryption key. 
4.2 The Code-Checker Crosscuts 
Java's security model is focused on protecting users 
from hostile programs downloaded from un-trusted 
sources across a network. To accomplish this goal, Java 
provides a customizable "sandbox", which restricts the 
operations an application can perform. 
1. public Crosscut sandbox = new MethodCut() {
2. public void METHOD_ARGS(ANY x, REST pp) {
3. key=null;
4. }
5. protected PointCutter pointCutter() {
6. PointCutter native = Within.method(NATIVE_MODIFIER);
7. PointCutter fork =
Within.method("exec").AND(type("java.lang.Runtime"));
8. PointCutter loader = Within.subType("java.lang.ClassLoader")).
9. AND(NOT(Within.type(“java.security.SecureClassLoader”));
10. return Executions.before().AND(native.OR(fork).OR(loader));
11. }
12.};
Figure 4. The Sandbox Crosscut
In our case the problem is the opposite. The trusted 
aspects sent by the trusted server, in principle, cannot 
trust the environment they will be deployed in. In 
particular, an attacker could make use of the Java 
runtime to deceive the dynamic aspect. To this aim, 
deployed aspects prohibit many “dangerous” activities 
to the executing application. As shown in code fragment 
of figure 4, the following potentially insecure operations 
are disallowed: (1) call to native methods (line 6), (2) 
execution of external processes (line 7), and replacement 
of default secure class loader (line 8). 
1.public Crosscut bytecodeChecker = new MethodCut() {
2. public void METHOD_ARGS(ANY x, REST pp) {
3. String className = 
4. thisJoinPoint().getThis().getClass().getName();
5. String method = 
6. thisJoinPoint().getSignature().toLongString();
7. if (!checkBytecode(className, method)) 
8. key=null;
9. }
10. protected PointCutter pointCutter() {
11. return Executions.before().
12. AND(Within.packageTypes("it.polito.chat.*"));
13. }
14.};
Figure 5. The Bytecode Checker Crosscut 
Once the aspect is shielded against (naïve) 
disablement attacks, it can safely attend the checking 
task. To this aim, the aspect contains the bytecode 
checker crosscut (see Figure 5) resorts to BCEL Java 
library [14] to access the application bytecode and 
eventually calculate each method checksum (the above-
mentioned encryption key is used). Checksums are then 
compared against an on-board list of pre-computed 
values. The advice (METHOD_ARGS method) is called 
whenever an application method is invoked. As shown 
on lines 10 to 13, all calls within the application package 
(“it.polito.chat”) are monitored. The aspect makes use of 
the PROSE API to extract the actual method signature 
and class name (lines 3 to 6). It then compares the 
bytecode hash with the original one (line 7): if they 
differ the key is nullified (line 8), and the tag generator 
will send wrong tags, implicitly notifying the server that 
something went wrong. 
5. Threat analysis and discussion 
The three main attacks to software integrity 
mechanisms are discovery, disablement, and 
replacement [3].  
Discovery is the first step to disable or replace 
protections. Our approach makes discovery more 
difficult because the code-checking module is not 
bundled within the application deployed on the un-
trusted host. Furthermore, even if the module is 
discovered at runtime, its limited time validity reduces 
attacker possibilities. Thus, static inspection tools are 
defeated by our approach, thanks to dynamic loading of 
the TTG module. Dynamic analysis tools, such as 
debuggers and profilers, pose a possible threat to our 
approach. However, the threat is moderate because the 
human is involved in the loop, and, through dynamic 
replacement, we bound the time available to the human 
in order to discovery the checker position/behavior.  
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The fact that AOP allows the integrity-checking code 
to be well-modularized and separated from the rest of 
the client could seem dangerous. However, the client-
deployed aspect implements both the checking 
mechanism and the tag generation. Thus disablement
attack is not a concern, as disablement of checker also 
disables the tag generator. Hence the server would 
detect the attack (tags are no longer generated).  
As current dynamic AOP platforms do not take 
advantage of security technologies, our prototype is 
exposed to replacement attacks currently. That is, once 
the dynamic aspect is captured using packet sniffers, the 
attacker could decompile it, understand the TTG 
behavior, and replace it with a forged copy. It is unlikely 
that such a complex attack can be completed manually 
before the aspect expiration time elapses. Nonetheless, 
the only possibility to thwart an automated replacement 
attack is combining different protection techniques (e.g. 
obfuscation) and reducing the TTG time validity.  
In general, a possible improvement to increase 
complexity of attacks would be based on an overlapping 
coverage of multiple integrity checking aspects, so that 
each aspect is validated by several others. The 
disablement of one or more of the aspect advices would 
be detected by the aspects still in place. Additionally, 
each aspect could perform different types of code 
integrity checking to improve the overall strength of our 
approach to the above-mentioned attacks. Finally, 
customization of aspect code would help either, so that 
inferring the behavior of a newly updated aspect starting 
from the previous one was difficult. 
Finally, similarly to all software-based techniques, 
we rely on a possibly un-trusted external platform: the 
PROSE environment in our case. Reliance on such un-
trusted support could make the whole system vulnerable. 
However, our prototype could be extended in order to 
check authenticity of underlying PROSE virtual 
machine as well.  
6. Conclusions
We presented TrustedFlow, an innovative, all-in-
software methodology to deal with remote verification 
of correct execution for client-side application code. The 
proposed solution extends state-of-the-art integrity-
checking techniques by providing automated and 
periodic replacement of checking code during run-time. 
Furthermore, our approach supports the continuous 
attestation of integrity by a remote server. 
We presented a prototype implementation of 
TrustedFlow that is based on Java and dynamic AOP. 
Aspect-oriented programming proved to be a powerful 
and effective technique to seamlessly weave the 
integrity checker with the application program. As a 
positive outcome, the strategy adopted by the checker is 
not visible through static code analysis, and the attacker 
duty is made even heavier thanks to continuous 
replacement of the checking aspect. In our prototype, 
integrity checking is based on secure checksums of 
executed bytecode, which are continuously compared 
with pre-calculated correct values. 
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